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PUBLICITY DILUTION: A PROPOSAL FOR
PROTECTING PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Sarah M. Konskyt

I. INTRODUCTION

The right of publicity prohibits commercial use of a person's
name or likeness without the person's consent.' The right is grounded
in property rationales and is supposed to safeguard the economic
value of a person's name or likeness against commercial
exploitation,2 however, the current right of publicity goes much
farther. Courts have read the protection of a use of a name or likeness
broadly, allowing recovery for everything from the use of a robotic
depiction of a celebrity to the use of a comedian's catchphrase.3 A
nonfamous person can recover under the right even though her
persona does not have an inherent economic value.4 In some cases, a
person can recover without showing actual economic injury to her
persona.5 The result is an extremely broad right of publicity, in which
a person can recover for commercial uses of almost anything
associated with her identity.
The right of publicity has become too unwieldy and overbroad,
and it goes beyond its purpose of protecting the underlying economic

t
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1.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

2. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977);
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). For a discussion
of the different property rationales, see infra Part II.A.
3. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the use of
robot dressed to look like Vanna White and depicted on game show set violated White's right of
publicity); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
the use of Carson's catchphrase "Here's Johnny" as the name of a business violated Carson's
right of publicity).
4. See Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity
Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1605, 162123(2001).
5. See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28:1 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that a likelihood of some harm is sufficient).
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value in a person's name or likeness. 6 Further, the expansive right
chills valuable speech that would otherwise be protected under the
First Amendment. The current right of publicity curbs society's
entitlements under the First Amendment to invoke the names and
likenesses of cultural icons.7 Many appropriations contain both
commercial and noncommercial speech, and therefore do not
automatically warrant the lower level of protection given to purely
commercial speech under the First Amendment.8
This paper proposes a new standard of right of publicity dilution
based on trademark dilution law. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
("FTDA") prohibits commercial use of a famous mark that dilutes the
mark's economic value. 9 The FTDA strikes an optimal balance by
preventing use of a mark that harms property interests, while allowing
more benign use of the mark. The FTDA's three key requirements of
a famous mark, a commercial use, and actual dilution1 ° should be
applied in publicity cases. The FTDA standard would strike an
optimal balance between protecting a celebrity's economic value and
protecting the public's interest in speaking about its cultural icons.
Part II explains the origins and current status of the right of
publicity. Part III provides a general summary of trademark law and a
detailed analysis of the FTDA. Part IV proposes a new right of
publicity dilution modeled on trademark dilution law. The argument
for a new right of publicity dilution law proceeds in several parts.
First, the current right of publicity is overprotective and inconsistent
with the rationales behind the right. Second, a right of publicity
dilution modeled after trademark dilution law would provide an
optimal balance between preventing uses that cause economic harm
and allowing free dialogue about cultural icons. The key requirements
of this right of publicity dilution are a famous mark, a use in
commerce, and actual dilution. Finally, an application of the right of
publicity dilution to past cases illustrates that the proposed right
provides an ideal level of publicity protection.

6.

See generally Vincent M. de Grandprd, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An

Economic Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73
(2001).

7. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the FirstAmendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 65-68 (1994).
8. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
9.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
10. Id.

PUBLICITY DILUTION

2005]

II.

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The right of publicity is a relatively new right that was first
adopted by a court in 1953.11 Currently, the right of publicity
prohibits unauthorized commercial use of a person's name or
likeness. 12 To critically evaluate the right of publicity, it is necessary
to understand the origins and justifications for publicity protection,
the relevant statutory and common law bases of the right, and the
current application of the right in case law.
A. Originsand TheoreticalBackground
Early foundations for the right of publicity were based in the
right of privacy.13 Prosser listed appropriation, which protects against
the use of another's name or likeness for the benefit of the user, as
one of the four privacy torts.1 4 The privacy rationale suggests that
unauthorized uses of a person's name or likeness will offend the
person's dignity by exploiting her identity.' 5 For example, a person
who unexpectedly finds herself depicted in an advertisement may
suffer harms traditionally associated with an invasion of privacyfrom a violation of her right to be left alone to an invasion of her
inviolate personality.16
However, most courts and commentators now ground the right of
publicity in property rationales. In the first case to adopt the right of
publicity, the Second Circuit stated that "it is common knowledge that
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and
subways."' 17 Several strands of the property-rights rationale have
emerged. One common argument is that the right is grounded in an

11.

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).

12.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

13.
See J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1704-07 (1987).
14.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser identified the
four privacy torts as public disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, false light, and
appropriation of name or likeness. Id.

15. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 162
(Aspen 2003).
16. See generally Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).

17.

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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incentive to produce; in essence, a Lockean labor theory.1 8 Protection
of a person's name and likeness against commercial use gives the
person an incentive to develop a public and famous persona. As the
Supreme Court stated, "the State's interest in permitting a 'right of
publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in
his act in part to encourage such entertainment." ' 9 A second argument
is that the right of publicity prevents a congestion externality.20
Unrestricted use of a person's name or likeness makes that name or
likeness less scarce and thus, less valuable. 21 Similarly, it can create
22
consumer confusion about which uses are authorized by the person.
A third argument for the right of publicity is unjust enrichment.23 A
commercial user should not be able to benefit from a person's
investment in developing a public and famous persona.24 Finally, an
alternative argument is that the right of publicity should be an
inherent right.25 Under this view, the right of publicity should be
"viewed as a property right grounded in human autonomy" that
should extend to all people regardless of fame.26
B. Right of Publicity Law
Today, more than half of the states recognize a right of publicity,
either as a matter of statutory or common law.2 7 The Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Unfair Competition has also adopted a right of
publicity. 28 Under the Restatement, a violation of the right occurs
when one "appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity
by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia
of identity for purposes of trade.",29 A comment to the Restatement
states that the right "allows a person to prevent harmful or excessive

18.

See Kwall, supra note 7, at 79-80.

19.

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
See Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:A Dirge, 40 HoUs. L. REV. 621, 634

20.

(2003).
21.
22.

See ld.
See Kwall, supra note 7, at 75-79.

23.

See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; Kwall, supra note 7, at 80.

24.
25.

See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
See Alice Haemrnmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49

DUKE L.J. 383, 385-86 (1999).

26.
27.
2000).

See id. at 385.
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2d ed.

28.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

29.

Id.
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commercial use that may dilute the value of the identity."3 ° This
comment suggests that dilution is a concern motivating the right of
publicity. A plaintiffs remedies for infringement of the right of
publicity 31 include injunctions, actual damages, and punitive
damages.
A state right of publicity was recognized one time by the
Co.3 2
Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
The case involved a human cannonball, whose fifteen-second
performance consisted of him being shot into a net two hundred feet
away.3 3 A television reporter filmed the performance, and the
reporter's station aired it in its entirety. 34 The Court affirmed that the
use of the human cannonball's performance violated his right of
publicity under state law.3 5 However, this holding is quite limited and
does little to delineate the scope of the right of publicity. The Court
was concerned that the broadcast of the entire act would threaten the
economic value of the performance; 36 it might not have reached the
same conclusion if less than the entire act were appropriated.
Despite the lack of Supreme Court precedent, the right of
publicity has been adopted by a myriad of lower courts. A paradigm
violation of the right of publicity occurs when a company uses the
name or likeness of a celebrity to make its product more attractive to
the public. For example, a professional hockey player could recover
under the right of publicity if a comic book author named a character
after the player without the player's authorization. 37 Similarly, fashion
model Christie Brinkley could recover under the right of publicity if a
publisher made and distributed posters of her image without her
consent. 38 These clear-cut cases easily meet the requirements of the
right of publicity tort: a person's name or39 likeness was used in
commerce without the person's authorization.

30.
31.

Id. § 46 cmt. c.
Id. at §§ 48-49; see also Matthew Savare, Comment, The Priceof Celebrity: Valuing

the Right of Publicity in Calculating Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129,

149-59 (2004) (discussing the different state law remedies for infringement of the right of
publicity).
32. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
33. Id. at 562-63.
34. Id. at 564, 569.
35. Id. at 578.
36. Id. at 575-76.
37. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
38. See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
39.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

352

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 21

The lower courts have attempted to define the contours of the
right of publicity in more difficult cases. Two aspects of the tort have
led to much litigation. First, courts have had to decide what
constitutes the use of a person's identity for purposes of the statute.
Right of publicity statutes or common law rights typically prohibit the
use of a person's name or likeness. 40 However, courts have taken an
expansive view of what constitutes an appropriation of identity and
have allowed right of publicity causes of action for use of a person's
nickname,4 ' use of a caricature or robot portraying a person,4 2 use of
an inanimate object closely associated with a person,43 use of the
name of a fictional character closely associated with a person," and
use of a person's famous catchphrase.4 5 Second, courts have struggled
to determine what constitutes a commercial use or a use for purposes
of trade.46 Courts have developed several tests for determining when
expressive works, such as artwork or songs, naming or depicting a
celebrity, should be entitled to protection. 47 Arguably, these linedrawing difficulties are inherent in a right protecting a person's name
or likeness.
The right of publicity has grown immensely since its first
adoption by courts fifty years ago. Courts have struggled to determine
the outer limits of protection under the right of publicity. Scholars

40. See, e.g., id. (protecting name, likeness and indicia of identity); see also CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 2004) (protecting name, photograph or likeness); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2004) (protecting name, portrait, picture or voice).
41. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (holding a
cause of action for appropriation where famous football player Elroy Hirsch's nickname
"Crazylegs" was used on shaving gel products).
42. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the
use of robot dressed to look like Vanna White and depicted on game show set violated White's
right of publicity).
See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
43.
(holding the use of distinctive racing car associated with a famous driver constituted a use of the
driver's name or likeness).
44. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding the use of the name of
character "Spanky McFarland" could violate the right of publicity of the actor who played that
character).
45.
See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding the use of Carson's catchphrase "Here's Johnny" as the name of a business violated
Carson's right of publicity).
46.
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
painting of Tiger Woods was protected by the First Amendment); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329
F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that song entitled "Rosa Parks" was not protected by the First
Amendment); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
parody of a movie still was protected by the First Amendment).

47.

For a discussion of the different tests, see ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931-36.
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Nevertheless, the
argue the right is unwieldy and overprotective. 48 Nvrhl
judicial and legislative trend is toward recognizing a publicity right of
some sort. This paper proposes a shift to a more limited publicity
right that protects the economic value of a person's name and
likeness.
III. TRADEMARK DILUTION

The primary purpose of trademark law is to "reduce consumer
search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the
particular source of particular goods." 49 A trademark is an identifying
marker a manufacturer puts on a product-for example, COCACOLA soft drinks or VOLKSWAGEN cars. Trademark law addresses
attempts by secondary users to capitalize on the goodwill associated
with a trademark. An overview of trademark law must include a brief
explanation of the two types of trademark protection, trademark
infringement law and trademark dilution law. The proposed right of
publicity is based on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA").
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the requirements of the FTDA in
detail.
A. TrademarkProtection:Infringement andDilution
The traditional means for protecting a trademark is a trademark
infringement action under the Lanham Act. 50 Infringement law is
motivated by a concern about consumer fraud, and therefore requires
a showing of consumer confusion. 5' A paradigm case of trademark
infringement occurs when a secondary user tries to pass her goods off
as being associated with a primary user by appropriating the primary
user's trademark. For example, a company might sell HERSHEY
potato chips, hoping that consumers will think their product is made
by the HERSHEY candy company. Trademark law thus protects the
symbols that indicate the source of a good or service.52

48. For a discussion of these criticisms, see e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993); Eric J.
Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 227 (1999).
49. Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
51. Id.
52. Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of
Trademark Infringement,68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2000).
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In 1996, Congress changed the landscape of trademark
protection by passing the FTDA. 53 Unlike a trademark infringement
action, a trademark dilution action can be brought in the absence of
consumer confusion about the goods. 54 Trademark dilution law is
concerned with protecting a trademark owner against uses that
"whittle away" the value of the mark, diminishing its uniqueness.55
As the House Report to the FTDA stated, dilution "applies when the
unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception56
that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular.,
Thus, dilution is substantially broader than infringement; it only
requires harm to the value of the trademark.
Generally, trademark dilution occurs when marks are blurred or
tarnished. 57 Blurring occurs when a mark is associated with an
unrelated product, regardless of consumer confusion.5 8 For example,
the House Report to the FTDA stated that "the use of DUPONT
shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos" would be prohibited
under the FTDA. 59 A key harm of blurring is that consumer search
costs increase when a trademark is associated with a number of
unrelated products. 60 Tarnishment occurs when a mark is associated
with something unsavory. 6 1 A tarnishing use dilutes a trademark by

causing consumers to associate negative connotations with the mark.
B. FederalTrademark Dilution Act
The FTDA states that "the owner of a famous mark shall be
entitled... to an injunction against another person's commercial use
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
53.
54.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
See id.

55.

See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.

REV. 813 (1927). Schechter's article is the seminal article of the dilution movement.
56. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
57. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030).
58. See id; see also Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,
J.).
59. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
60. Ty, Inc., 306 F.3d at 511 (Posner, J.). Judge Posner discusses the problem with a
restaurant called Tiffany's:
[W]hen consumers next see the name "Tiffany" they may think about both the
restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an identifier
of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder-incur as it
were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as the name of the store.
Id.
61. See infra Part lII.B.3.
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mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark., 62 Dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception., 63 The FTDA exempts fair use in comparative
commercial advertising, 64 noncommercial use, 65 and use in news
reporting and news commentary.66
1. Distinctive and Famous Mark Requirements
To qualify for protection under the FTDA, a mark must be
distinctive and famous.6 7 The distinctiveness requirement ensures that
generic terms simply naming the product they represent are not
protected because such protection would strip competitors of the right
to refer to their products by name.68 Courts differentiate several levels
of distinctiveness and ultimately grant the most protection to arbitrary
or fanciful marks having no logical relationship to the product they
identify.

69

Legislative history suggests that Congress intended to single out
the most famous marks for protection.70 Indeed, courts have stated
that they should be "discriminating and selective" in deciding which
marks are famous. 71 The FTDA lists eight factors that a court may
consider in declaring a mark famous, including the distinctiveness of
the mark, the duration of the use of the mark, the degree of
recognition of the mark, and the existence of other similar marks. 2
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1) (2000).
Id. § 1127.
Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A).
Id. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
Id § 1125(c)(4)(C).
Id.§ 1125(c).
See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id.at 216.
See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (BNA Books 2001).

71.
72.

IP. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1stCir. 1998).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to--(A) the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the
duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographic
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for
the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition
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The FTDA requires
that the mark be famous at the time of the alleged
73
diluting use.

A more difficult inquiry is whether a mark can meet the fame
requirement if it is famous in a limited geographic market or in a
niche market. Citing the legislative history of the FTDA, courts have

agreed that fame cannot be local.74 Courts have split on whether
marks famous in niche markets meet the fame requirement. 75 The

Seventh Circuit has opined that the outcome of these cases turns on
whether the plaintiff and defendant are using the mark in the same
niche market; if so, the mark meets the fame requirement.76 Thus, in

some cases a plaintiff might be able to meet the fame requirement by
showing fame in a niche market.
2. Use in Commerce Requirement.
The FTDA's prohibition of trademark dilution could potentially
bar a good deal of speech otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. To minimize First Amendment concerns, the FTDA is
limited to commercial use 77 and explicitly exempts noncommercial
use of a trademark.7 8 Thus, the FTDA only reaches commercial
speech, which the Supreme Court has held is entitled to a low level of
protection under the First Amendment.79
In many cases, the noncommercial use exemption will be
straightforward. An example of a clearly commercial use is the
appropriation of the famous TIFFANY mark for the name of a

of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner
and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark
was registered ....
Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th
Cir. 1999). "The legislative history of the statute makes clear that Congress intended that, in
order to be 'famous,' a mark must be used in a substantial segment of the United States." Id. at
641 n.7.
75. Compare id. at 641 (concluding that the fame in a niche market could satisfy the fame
requirement when both the defendant and the plaintiff used the mark in the same niche market)
with TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001)
(concluding it is unlikely Congress intended to protect marks famous only in niche markets).
76. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
78. Id. §§ 1125(c), 1125(c)(4)(B).
79. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
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business unrelated to the famous jewelry store.8 ° In contrast, an
example of a clearly noncommercial use is the use of the famous
TIFFANY mark in a history textbook's discussion about famous
jewelry stores. Other cases are more difficult. For example, courts
disagree about whether mixed speech with both commercial and
noncommercial elements should fall within the FTDA's
noncommercial use exemption.8 1
3. Actual Dilution Requirement
The FTDA requires that the use "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark.",82 The Supreme Court recently held
that a plaintiff must show actual dilution of the mark, rather than a
mere likelihood of dilution.83 However, the Court did not define
actual dilution. At one extreme, it is not enough that the use of the
junior mark conjures up mental associations of the famous mark.84 At
the other extreme, it is not required that the user of the senior mark
prove the consequences of dilution, such as lost profits.85 The Court
left open the possibility that circumstantial evidence of actual dilution
could be sufficient in cases where it would be reliable, notably in
cases where the senior mark and junior mark are identical.86
Commentators have speculated that the actual dilution requirement
the FTDA, as the requirement
may deter plaintiffs from suing under
87
raises the plaintiffs burden of proof.
Courts recognize two main types of dilution: blurring and
tarnishment. Blurring is described as the whittling away of a well80. Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prod., Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932).
Compare Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430
81.
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that commercial speech is speech containing a commercial
element) with Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that commercial speech is speech that "does no more than propose a commercial transaction").
For a discussion of this split, see Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Diluting the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: "Noncommercial Use" and the Federal TrademarkDilution Act, 71 U. CHI. L. REv.

1077(2004).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
83. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2003).
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the ConstitutionalEdge, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 161, 183-84 (2004) (noting that the actual dilution standard will require FTDA
plaintiffs to incur the expense of obtaining consumer surveys, circumstantial evidence, or other
proof of actual dilution). But see Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434 ("Whatever difficulties of proof may
be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element
of a statutory violation.").
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known mark's distinctiveness.88 A signficant harm of blurring is that
the consumer incurs higher search costs; even if the consumer is not
confused by the multiple sources of the mark, the consumer must still
ask to which source the use of the mark refers.8 9 Courts have adopted
a wide variety of multi-factor tests to measure blurring. 90 Some courts
have adopted the test proposed by Judge Sweet in his Mead Data
Central, Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.9 1 concurrence that
examines the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the products,
sophistication of the consumers, predatory intent, renown of the
senior mark, and renown of the junior mark.92 In contrast, the Second
Circuit declines to set forth a definitive set of factors, instead
providing a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors to consider,
including "actual confusion and likelihood of confusion, shared
consumers and geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the
junior use, and the interrelated factors of duration of the junior use,
harm to the junior user, and delay by the senior in bringing the
action. 93 The Seventh Circuit examines only two factors, the renown
of the senior mark and the similarity of the marks. 94 Thus, there is
little agreement between courts about the ideal test for trademark
dilution. Ultimately, blurring cases appear to turn on the fame of the
senior mark, the similarity of the marks, and consumer confusion. In
some ways, the dilution inquiry resembles the confusion inquiry in
trademark infringement law. 95 If confusion exists, then dilution likely
exists, because "[c]onsumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the
distinctive selling power of [the] trademark., 96 Thus under the FTDA,
confusion can be seen as a sufficient, but not as a necessary condition
for a finding of dilution.97

88. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 102829, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. See Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
90. For a discussion of the competing approaches, see Gerard N. Magliocca, One and
Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REv. 949, 984-86
(2001).
91.
875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
92. Id. at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring). For a discussion of the test and a list of the courts
adopting the test, see WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 247-48.
93. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1999). For a
discussion of the test and a list of the courts adopting the test, see WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at
248-50.
94. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000).
95.

See WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 256.

96.
97.

Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 219.
See id.
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A subset of blurring is tarnishment: degrading a mark's positive
associations by linking the mark with unsavory products or ideas. 98
Tarnishment often occurs when the senior mark is associated with
something unwholesome and can occur when the senior mark is
associated with poor quality goods. 99 For example, tarnishment of the
Budweiser mark occurred when a junior user sold BUTTWISER
merchandise. 0 0
Trademark dilution law has been the subject of criticism.' 0' As
the preceding discussion suggests, courts have struggled to read
specific requirements into the rather vague language of the FTDA.
Courts have not settled on tests for noncommercial use or dilution.
However, these shortcomings do not mean that trademark dilution law
is flawed in concept. Rather, the shortcomings could simply indicate
that Congress or the Supreme Court needs to clarify the boundaries of
this new area of the law.
IV. PUBLICITY DILUTION PROPOSAL

The current right of publicity should be replaced with a right of
publicity dilution, similar to trademark dilution law. A right of
publicity dilution would prohibit the most harmful uses of a person's
name or likeness without chilling valuable commentary. This
argument proceeds in several parts. First, criticism of the current right
of publicity illustrates the need to amend the right of publicity.
Second, a publicity dilution right modeled after trademark dilution
law would create an ideal standard. Third, it is necessary to set out the
precise contours of the publicity dilution right. It is also useful to
examine the difficult cases that could arise under the proposed
standard and to propose alternative avenues of recourse for people
who cannot recover under the standard. Finally, an application of the
proposed right of publicity dilution to different cases illustrates that
the publicity dilution right provides an optimal level of protection.

98. There is debate about whether tamishment should be part of the dilution analysis.
While tamishment was part of many state antidilution statutes and was mentioned in the
legislative history to the FTDA, a tarnishment action might not be supported by the text of the
FTDA. For a discussion, see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
99. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 265.
100. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
101. See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The WhittlingAway of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997); Kenneth L. Port, The
"Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 460 (1994).
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A. Criticism of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity has been subject to much criticism. 102 First,
differing state right of publicity standards create undesirable
inconsistencies in the law. Commentators argue a uniform federal
standard is needed.10 3 Without a uniform standard, a person wanting
to use another's name or likeness must undertake a time-consuming
examination of the publicity laws of the different states. 10 4 Similarly,
a person's ability to recover for an unauthorized use of her likeness
varies depending on the state in which she sues. 0 5 Inconsistent state
law may also encourage forum shopping, in which litigants seek the
forum with the most sympathetic laws to their positions. 106 Thus,
differences among state right of publicity statutes may cause practical
problems for both potential users of a person's name or likeness and
people attempting to vindicate their publicity rights.
Courts have recognized that the right of publicity carries a risk of
infringing on First Amendment rights. 0 7 Much commentary on the
right of publicity addresses the proper balance between the right and
the First Amendment.10 8 Commentators argue that the right of
publicity can be too broad, prohibiting expression that should be
protected under the First Amendment.'0 9 This problem is alleviated in
part by the fact that the right only regulates commercial use of a
person's name or likeness. Commercial speech is afforded a low level
of protection under the First Amendment, and therefore can be subject
to regulations that political speech cannot. 110 However, many
appropriations contain both commercial and noncommercial elements
and thus, do not automatically warrant a low level of First

102. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc and arguing that the right
of publicity is overprotective of celebrities' images); Madow, supra note 48 (arguing that the
rationales for the right of publicity are not compelling).
103. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 48.
104. Id. at 228.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 244. Forum shopping may also make it difficult for parties to inform themselves
ex ante about publicity rights. To make informed decisions, parties must know about the laws of
all of the states. Id.
107. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003).
108. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 7; Madow, supra note 48, at 134-46.
109. See Kwall, supra note 7.
110. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (holding that truthful advertising could be regulated if regulation furthers a
substantial government interest and is not overbroad).
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Amendment protection.' 11 Further, the current right of publicity curbs
society's entitlements under the First Amendment to invoke the
names and likenesses of cultural icons.' 1 2 Thus, the right of publicity
can chill valuable speech.
Further, critics of the right of publicity argue that the right is
overprotective. 1 3 The right of publicity is intended to protect a
person's proprietary and financial interests in her identity. 4
However, the right goes far beyond the goal of protecting proprietary
and financial interests. First, a majority of courts hold that the right of
publicity protects the names and likenesses of all people, regardless of
fame." 15 Nonfamous people may not have significant proprietary or
financial interests in their names or likenesses. Rather, their
objections to the use of their names or likenesses may be grounded
only in privacy rationales, such as injury to their mental and
emotional well-being.1 16 Further, a plaintiff alleging a right of
publicity violation is not required to show actual damages; a
likelihood of some damage is sufficient.' 17 In the absence of an
identifiable loss, a showing of unjust enrichment may be enough for
recovery.' 18 The right of publicity, thus, is overinclusive, going
beyond its goal of protecting the economic value of a person's name
or likeness.
Similarly, some critics question the utility of a broad right of
publicity. 119 A comment to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition lays out many of the criticisms:

111. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).

112. See Kwall, supra note 7, at 65-68 ("Society's entitlement to invoke the personas of
our cultural icons is substantially diminished in the context of patently commercial
appropriations.").
113. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); de Grandprd, supra note
6.
114. Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or Public
Domain?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1995).
115. See Hunt, supra note 4, at 1621-23. Under this view, the plaintiff's fame goes to the
amount of damages, but not to the existence of the right. Id. at 1621.
116. See Spahn, supra note 114, at 1025. For a discussion of the interests of non-famous
persons, see infra Part IV.C.2. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 4; Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco, Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 n.l I (9th Cir. 1974).
See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
117.
COMPETITION § 28:1 (4th ed. 1997).

MCCARTHY

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

118. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11.8[B][C] (West 1999).
119.

See generally Madow, supranote 48, at134-46.
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The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are
generally less compelling than those that justify rights in
trademarks or trade secrets. The commercial value of a person's
identity often results from success in endeavors such as
entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial rewards.
Any additional incentive attributable to the right of publicity may
have only marginal significance. In other cases the commercial
value acquired by a person's identity is largely fortuitous or
otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus
diminishing the weight of the property and unjust enrichment
rationales for protection ....
Thus, courts may be properly
reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the publicity right.12°
This criticism suggests that the right of publicity may not be
adequately tailored to meet its end goal of protecting the economic
value of a person's name or likeness.
B. TrademarkDilution Law Provides the CorrectLevel of
Protection
A dilution standard provides ample protection against uses that
cause economic damage, but does not silence other valuable speech.
The current right of publicity should be replaced by a publicity
dilution right similar to trademark dilution law. This right could
develop in three different ways. First, Congress could amend the
FTDA to include personas. Under this standard, a person's name or
likeness would be entitled to the same protection as a trademark.
Alternatively, Congress could pass a separate publicity dilution
statute modeled on the FTDA. This scheme is preferable, because it
gives Congress more latitude to consider unique situations that may
arise in the publicity context, but not in the trademark context.
Congress should have the power to enact such regulations under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.1 2 1Finally, judges
could simply begin to apply the FTDA or dilution standards in
publicity cases. However, legislative history suggests that Congress
did not intend for the FTDA to cover names, likenesses, or

120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995).
121.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Congress has
the authority to regulate trademarks under the Commerce Clause. It follows that Congress
should have the authority to regulate similar uses of personas. For a discussion of
Congressional authority to enact a federal right of publicity, see Goodman, supra note 48, at
240.
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identities. 122 Therefore, Congressional action probably is preferable to
judicial action in this case.
The publicity dilution standard would be a significant departure
from the current state of trademark law. Celebrities have some
recourse under trademark law when their names or likenesses rise to
the level of a trademark.123 However, courts have taken a narrow view
of what constitutes a celebrity's trademark, typically limiting
trademark protection to a celebrity's name and most famous
depictions. 2 4 As it stands, trademark law is not equipped to subsume
the right of publicity.125 The limited protection afforded to celebrities
under trademark law is insufficient to protect a celebrity's persona
from economic harm.
Therefore, Congress should expand upon existing trademark
dilution law to create a new right of publicity dilution, either by
amending the FTDA or passing a new statute. First, Congress should
recognize the similarities between trademark protection and publicity
protection. Commentators have noted the similarities between the
right of publicity and trademark dilution law 126 and have proposed
127
using aspects of trademark law in right of publicity cases.
Trademarks are symbols that represent the source of goods or
services. Trademark dilution law ensures that secondary uses of these
symbols do not dilute the power of the symbol to represent the source

122.

See WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 215.

123.
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445-47 (6th Cir. 2003) (compiling
trademark infringement cases involving the use of celebrity's name or likeness). For a
discussion of what constitutes a trademark, see infra Part IV.C.I.
124.
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"as a general rule, a person's image or likeness cannot function as a trademark"); Pirone v.
MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "a photograph of a human
being, unlike a portrait of a fanciful cartoon character, is not inherently 'distinctive' in the
trademark sense of tending to indicate origin"). But see ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 941-42 (Clay,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "the jurisprudence clearly indicates that a person's image or likeness
can function as a trademark as long as there is evidence demonstrating that the likeness or image
was used as a trademark").
125.
See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 393-401 (illustrating that trademark law
would not provide an adequate remedy for a right of publicity violation).
See Kristine Boylan, The CorporateRight of Publicity in Federal TrademarkDilution
126.
Legislation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 349 (1998) (arguing that the FTDA in effect creates a right of
publicity for corporations); Malte Famaes, "Trademark Law" Caught in Love Triangle with
"Right of Publicity": Eastwood v. Superior Court, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 568 (2001)
(briefly noting that right of publicity claims often resemble dilution claims).
For the argument that trademark infringement should be amended to cover right of
127.
publicity claims, see Haemmerli, supra note 25. For the argument that the right of publicity
should be extended to cover instances of tamishment, see Edgar Sargent, Right of Publicity
Tarnishment and the FirstAmendment, 73 WASH. L. REV. 223 (1998).
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of the good. Similarly, a person's name or likeness serves as a
powerful symbol representing the underlying product of the persona
or the person's endorsement. 128 The law should protect against any
secondary use of a person's name or likeness that dilutes the value of
the underlying persona or the person's endorsement. When a person's
name or likeness is associated with a number of products or services,
it ceases to be unique and valuable.
Protection of publicity should be centered around its theoretical
underpinnings-protection of the economic value of a persona.12 9 For
illustrative purposes, the right of publicity dilution can be contrasted
with privacy protection. The right of publicity concerns itself with
injuries to the pocketbook while the right of privacy concerns itself
with injuries to the psyche.' 30 Therefore, a publicity right should be
focused on economic injury. A right of publicity dilution based on
FTDA standards would be more consistent with the property
rationales underlying publicity protection than the current right of
publicity. Under the current right of publicity, a plaintiff may recover
13
without showing actual harm to the economic value of her persona. '
A plaintiff may also be able to recover without showing that her
persona is famous and inherently valuable. 32 However, under the
proposed publicity dilution standard, a plaintiff will have to show
actual dilution to a valuable persona. Thus, the proposed new cause of
action for publicity dilution is significantly more restrictive than the
current right of publicity. For that reason, the proposed publicity
dilution should preempt the current right of publicity. 133 Thus, the
FTDA standards should be adopted in lieu of the current publicity
test. The specific requirements of the FTDA standards will be
explored in the following section.
128. At first glance, a person's name or likeness may seem too inextricably intertwined
with a person to function as a trademark. One could argue that a person's name or likeness are
not symbols representing a person, but rather part and parcel with the person. But in the
commercial realm, product names and likenesses conjure up equally powerful associations with
the underlying product. Arguably, the strength of association between a popular trademark and
its underlying product is no weaker than the association between a name of a celebrity and the
celebrity.
129. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
130.

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:61 (2d ed.

2000).
131.
See discussion supra Part IV.A; see, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:1 (4th ed. 1997); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § I1.8[B]-[C] (West 1999).

132. See discussion supra Part IV.A; see, e.g., Hunt, supra note 4.
133.
Some people who would have protection under the current right of publicity will be
without protection under the proposed right of publicity dilution. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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C. Requirements of the ProposedRight of Publicity
To recover under the right of publicity dilution, a person must
meet three requirements: a person must prove that her mark was
famous, that it was used in commerce without her authorization, and
that the use actually diluted her mark. This section examines these
requirements in detail. Specifically, it sets out the relevant standards,
discusses difficult cases that may arise and proposes alternate
remedies for persons who cannot recover under the relevant
standards.
1. Use of a Mark Requirement
Currently, a right of publicity action requires the use of a
person's name or likeness. 134 Courts have adopted a broad reading of
likeness.135 The FTDA requires "commercial use in commerce of a
mark., 136 This raises the question of what should be considered a
mark for purposes of the proposed publicity dilution standard.
The law should adopt trademark standards, with necessary
modifications to deal with differences between personas and
trademarks. A symbol becomes a trademark either through
registration with the Patent and Trademark Office or through
sufficient active use of the mark. 137 If Congress amends the FTDA to
include personas as trademarks, then famous persons could register
their personas. Similarly, if Congress creates a separate cause of
action for publicity dilution, it could create a registry of protected
personas. However, even in the absence of a registry system, a
celebrity persona could become protected through active use of the
persona.
A person's name and likeness should constitute a mark, as they
are the easiest identifiers of the underlying persona. More difficult
cases include whether protection should extend to a person's voice, a
caricature of a person, or a symbol associated with a person. Courts
should read the mark requirement broadly in the publicity dilution
context. The mark inquiry is intrinsically intertwined with the dilution
inquiry, which asks whether the person's image was blurred or

134.

E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3344 (Deering Supp. 2004); see discussion supra Part II.B.
135. See discussion supra Part 1I.B; see, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
137. See, e.g., Zazfi Designs v. L'Ordal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 502-03 (7th Cir. 1992).
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tarnished. That is, an attenuated mark that does not clearly and
specifically identify a person will not blur or tarnish a person's image.
An apt example is an advertisement with a caricature that loosely
resembles a celebrity. 138 This vague caricature arguably should be
considered a use of the celebrity's mark. The attenuated nature of the
use will be addressed by a blurring inquiry: If the caricature is not
sufficiently similar to the celebrity's image, then the public will not
associate the celebrity with the advertisement. Therefore, attenuated
use of a person's name or likeness will not blur the person's identity.
A broad definition of mark avoids unnecessary duplication of the
dilution inquiry.
The mark requirement of the publicity dilution test will be an
easy hurdle for a national celebrity to overcome. Virtually any use of
a plaintiffs image will constitute a use of a "mark." However, a
person who is not nationally known may not be able to meet the fame
requirement. The fame requirement is examined in detail in the
following section.
2. Distinctive and Famous Mark Requirements.
The majority of courts hold that the right of publicity applies to
all persons, regardless of fame. 139 To recover under the proposed
publicity dilution standard, the mark must be distinct and famous at
the time of the alleged infringing use.
a. Standard
First, a court must find that the mark is distinct. Courts have set a
high bar for distinctiveness in the trademark context.' 40 However,
courts must read distinctiveness more broadly in the publicity dilution
context. A celebrity's name and likeness are unique to that celebrity
and distinguish that celebrity from other people. Therefore, they
should be seen as distinct for purposes of publicity dilution.
Furthermore, a finding that only the most famous images of a

138.

This example is drawn from the facts of All v. Playgirl,Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-

27, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), which granted a preliminary injunction because plaintiff Mohammed
Ali proved he was likely to prevail on the claim that his right of publicity had been violated
when Playgirl published a caricature of a nude African-American man in a boxing ring and
identified the man in the caricature as "The Greatest."
139.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); Hunt, supra
note 4, at 1621-23.
140.
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922-23 (6th Cir. 2003); Pirone v.
MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 582-85 (2d Cir. 1990); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339, 1363-64 (D.N.J. 1981).
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celebrity are protected would lead to absurd results. A famous image
of Julia Roberts could not be used in an automobile advertisement,
but a nonfamous image of Julia Roberts could be used in the same
advertisement. Both cases involve the same exploitation of the
distinctiveness of Julia Roberts' image. The distinctiveness
requirement should not be difficult to meet in publicity dilution cases.
A person's name or likeness will have the requisite distinctiveness to
satisfy the requirement.
Publicity dilution law should apply many of the FTDA standards
for fame. Concededly, fame is difficult to quantify in any
circumstance.
However,
celebrity
lends
itself to
the
famous/nonfamous distinction as well as corporate trademarks do.
The eight-factor test for fame set out in the FTDA 14 1 translates into a
useful test for determining the fame of a persona. Specifically, a court
examining fame under publicity dilution law should look to: (1) the
duration and extent that a person has used her name or likeness in
commercial settings; 142 (2) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the name or likeness; 143 (3) the geographic area in which
the name or likeness is used;' 44 (4) the scope of the use of the person's
name or likeness; 145 and (5) the degree of recognition of the person's
name or likeness. 46 A court should not require that the person be
famous on a national level, as is required under trademark dilution
law. 147 People are more likely to achieve significant fame locally, but
not nationally. For example, local newscasters and politicians are
likely to be extremely famous in their communities. Publicity dilution
law therefore should protect both locally and nationally famous
persons. Further, fame in a niche market may48be enough to meet the
fame standard in some limited circumstances.
141.
15 U.S.C. § II 25(c)(1) (2000). For the list of factors, see supra note 72.
142. See id. § 11 25(c)(1)(B) (stating "the duration and extent of the use of the mark in
connection with goods or services with which the mark is used").
143. Id. § I 125(c)(1)(C) (stating "the duration and extent of the advertising and publicity
of the mark").
144. Id. § 125(c)(1)(D) (stating "the geographic extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used").
145. Id. § 1125(c)(1)(E) (stating "the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used").
146. Id. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (stating "the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought").
147. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire
Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
148. See, e.g., supra Part III.B. 1; Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640-41; TCPIP Holding Co.
v. Harr Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001).
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As in the trademark dilution context, courts should set a high bar
for famousness. The proposed publicity dilution law should address
uses that harm the economic value of a person's name or likeness.
Famousness can be used as a screening mechanism to ensure the
underlying persona is sufficiently valuable to warrant recovery under
the statute.
b. Difficult Cases
In the trademark context, it is safe to assume that the owner of a
famous mark wanted the mark to become famous and took concrete
steps to make the mark famous. After all, the primary purpose of a
149
trademark is to provide source identification for goods and services.
Therefore, the only inquiry in a trademark dilution case is whether the
trademark achieved sufficient fame to meet the requirements of the
FTDA. Cases involving personal fame are more complicated.
The first difficult case is that of someone who is launched into
fame involuntarily and whose image is subsequently diluted by
commercial use. It is not safe to assume that a person wanted his
name or likeness to become famous. For example, Chicago Cubs fan
Steve Bartman became the subject of international fame after he
reached out for a foul ball that might otherwise have been caught by
Cubs left fielder Moises Alou for a key out in a playoff game." 5
Trademark dilution law does not provide guidance about whether
Bartman has the requisite fame to recover for the subsequent use of
his name or likeness on apparel or other merchandise.
A person who is involuntarily launched into the spotlight should
be considered famous for publicity dilution purposes. The person
acquired real fame. The person's persona meets some of the FTDA's
eight factors for determining famousness; most significantly, the mark
is recognizable on a national basis. 15' Ex post, the person's name or
likeness may have the same commercial value as the name or likeness
of someone who undertook efforts to become famous. If the right of
publicity dilution is about protecting a person's property right in a
valuable name or likeness, it should not matter how the persona
became famous. As the Ninth Circuit stated in a right of publicity
149. Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
150. Annie Sweeney, et. al., Diehard Cubs Fan Meant No Harm Touching Foul,
SupportersSay, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at 2. A Lexis search for "Steve Bartman" yields
1,760 news stories with his name (as of Oct. 29, 2004).
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). In addition, the mark may be used to a large
extent, the mark may be used in a wide geographic area, and the mark may be used in different
channels. See id § 1125(c)(1)(B)-(E).
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case, "The law protects a celebrity's sole right to exploit this value
whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb
luck, or a combination thereof."152 Similarly, the law provides legal
protection for trademarks that have become famous, even if the fame
was acquired through chance or through no affirmative act by the
trademark holder. The main argument to the contrary is that the
person did not invest sufficient resources into developing her name or
likeness. Indeed, the requirements for fame set out in the FTDA
appear to contemplate some degree of effort toward making the
trademark famous.153 Regardless, finding the requisite fame in this
case is consistent with the property rationales behind the right of
publicity dilution. Once the person was launched into fame, her name
and likeness became valuable property.
The second difficult case is that of someone who becomes
famous because of the very use of her name in commerce. The Ninth
Circuit recognized this possibility, stating that "the appropriation of
the identity of a relatively unknown person may result in economic
injury or may itself create economic value in what was previously
valueless.' 54 For example, a young woman at Mardi Gras was caught
on camera flashing her breasts. The image later was used on the
"Girls Gone Wild" video, the video's packaging, and other
promotional materials.1 55 After this use by "Girls Gone Wild," the
young woman arguably was famous.
A person cannot recover for publicity dilution when the alleged
diluting use launches her into fame. The FTDA requires that the
diluting use "begins after the mark has become famous."' 156 The
FTDA does not take potential for future fame into account. The only
relevant inquiry is whether the mark has achieved fame at the time of
the commercial use.' 57 Admittedly, this temporal requirement can be
harsh in its application. Returning to the "Girls Gone Wild" example,
the first appropriator of the woman's likeness would not be liable, but
152. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(i) (2000). For example, the FTDA examines the duration and
extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used,
the duration and extent of the advertising and publicity of the mark, the geographic extent of the
trading area in which the mark is used, and the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used.
154. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 n. 1 (9th Cir.
1974).
155. See Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, LLC, No. 4:0tcv495-RH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9307 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2003).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
157. Id.
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a subsequent appropriator may be liable if the first appropriator
sufficiently launched the woman into fame. However, judging fame
from an ex post perspective greatly diminishes the fame requirement.
The fame requirement would become an empty qualification that
would simply turn on the successfulness or popularity of the alleged
infringing use. The law arguably should defer to Congress's 5decision
8
that fame be evaluated at the time of the alleged diluting use.
The third difficult case is that of someone who used to be
famous. For example, a former child prodigy might decide to become
a recluse in his adulthood, taking great lengths to avoid public
attention.1 59 There are competing ways to approach whether someone
who has abandoned fame should have recourse under the proposed
publicity dilution statute. First, the court could make the same inquiry
into whether the person was famous at the time of the alleged diluting
use. If the person was not famous at that time, he could not recover.
However, this approach may have problematic results: A person who
was famous and seeks to leave the limelight might never be able to
erase her fame. tr° Therefore, courts should adopt the standard for
trademark abandonment. Under the Lanham Act, a mark is deemed to
be abandoned "when its use has been discontinued with intent not to
resume such use." 161 Similarly, a person taking sufficient measures to
return to the private life should be seen as having abandoned fame. A
person who has abandoned fame would not be able to recover under
the publicity dilution standard. 162 Simply put, a person not
capitalizing on the economic value of her former fame cannot recover
for dilution to that economic value.

158. See id. § 1125(c).
159. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
160. While this result might be intuitively troubling, it is consistent with a famous right of
privacy case. In Sidis, the court held that a famous person who became a recluse later in life
remained a public figure. Id. at 809. Therefore, he did not have recourse under privacy torts for
the publication of an unauthorized story about his life. Id. at 809-10.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Under this section, three years of nonuse of a registered
161.
mark is prima facie evidence of abandonment. However, the presumption is frequently rebutted
by a registrant's convincing demonstration that she intended to resume use. See BEVERLY W.
PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4.03 (Lexis Nexis 5th ed.
2002).
162. Note that this solution is not practical unless the law of privacy also recognizes
abandonment of fame. Otherwise, a person who had abandoned his fame may have no recourse
for invading uses of his image. He could not recover under the new right of publicity dilution
because he would not meet the fame requirement. Additionally, he could not recover under the
right of privacy because he would not be a private figure. Therefore, both publicity dilution law
and privacy law must move together for sensible results.
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c. Recoursefor the Nonfamous
The publicity dilution standard requires that a person be famous
at the time of the alleged dilution. Because publicity dilution protects
a person's economic worth, the right should not extend to individuals
who have not commercially exploited 'their economic worth. 163 A
criticism of this approach is that weaker marks will suffer more from
diluting uses. "Having only weakly established their identity in the
marketplace, the entrance of other products using the same mark
would inhibit their ability to gain a strong foothold in the public's
mind as a unique source of the goods."' 64 This criticism extends to the
have only weakly
use of names or likenesses of people who
65
established their identities in the marketplace. 1
However, nonfamous persons have recourse under other rights,
such as the right of privacy. Privacy law is best suited to address use
of the names or likenesses of nonfamous persons. While the right of
publicity deals with economic injury, the right of privacy deals with
injury to the psyche. 166 Thus, privacy law is intended to deal with use
of a person's name or likeness that causes emotional harms or offends
the expectation of solitude-the very injuries suffered by nonfamous
people.167 Two different privacy torts may protect the rights of
nonfamous persons. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion provides a
remedy when a person "intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns" in a way that would be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person."' 168 The tort of publicity given to private life makes
it illegal to "give[] publicity to a matter concerning the private life of

163.
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1613-16 (1979); see also Hunt, supra note 4, (arguing
that extending the right of publicity to non-celebrities is inconsistent with the First Amendment).
164.
(1991).
165.

David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 540
For example, the Ninth Circuit has stated that:
Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated, the
greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered. However, it is quite
possible that the appropriation of the identity of a celebrity may induce
humiliation, embarrassment and mental distress, while the appropriation of the
identity of a relatively unknown person may result in economic injury or may
itself create economic value in what was previously valueless.

Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1974).
166.

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:61 (2d ed.

2000).
167.

See Hunt, supra note 4.

168.

RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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another" that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is
69
not of legitimate concern to the public. 1
However, this approach might produce a gap in the law. There
may be cases in which a nonfamous person's name or likeness is used
in commerce, but that person does not have an avenue of recourse
under privacy law. An example can be drawn from the facts of
Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co. 170 A tile layer consented to be
filmed by a tile company for an instructional video.' 7 1 The tile
company subsequently used his image without consent in an
advertisement. 172 The tile layer would not have the requisite fame to
recover under the proposed publicity dilution standard. However, the
tile layer may also be unable to recover under privacy law. A court
may determine that the tile layer does not have a valid tort claim for
intrusion upon seclusion or public disclosure of private life because
he consented to the initial filming of his image. Thus, the tile layer
may be a loser under the proposed new regime.
This gap in the law does not mean that the proposed standard for
publicity dilution is flawed. The harm in this case is to the tile layer's
solitude and desire for a private life and not to the value of his
commercial persona. Therefore, privacy law should be the source of
his remedy. 173 Perhaps the tile layer case illustrates a need to expand
the current privacy law to cover this type of harm to a person's
solitude. Regardless, a nonfamous person should not be allowed to
recover for the dilution of his persona, since his persona was not of
economic value prior to the use.
3. Use in Commerce Requirement
The current right of publicity and trademark dilution law both
require that the use be in commerce.1 74 Therefore, the commercial use
requirement does not constitute a significant change in the law. This
requirement is intended to exempt speech that receives heightened
protection under the First Amendment from the purview of the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
1653-58.
174.

Id.§ 652D.
693 N.E.2d 510 (Il1.App. Ct. 1998).
Id.at511-12.
Id. at 512.
For a discussion of possible remedies for the non-famous, see Hunt, supra note 4, at
See discussion supra Parts IIB, IIl.B; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46.
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statutes.1 75 However, this requirement is not always easy to apply.
The difficult cases under the FTDA are cases of mixed speech with
both commercial and noncommercial elements. Courts have split on
how to characterize mixed speech. 176 Courts often consider parody or
artwork to be sufficiently noncommercial and outside the scope of
trademark dilution law, even if the parody or social commentary is
sold for profit. 177 However, other courts have taken a more stringent
view of the noncommercial use
defense, prohibiting the defense when
78
the speech is sold for profit.1
Resolving the ongoing debate about the proper classification of
mixed speech under the FTDA is beyond the scope of this paper.
Rather, it is sufficient to note thet this conundrum in many ways
mirrors a similar debate in the right of publicity context.' 79 Thus, the
shift from a right of publicity to a dilution regime would not make
this area of the law any more complicated. If anything, the fame and
actual dilution requirements of the proposed publicity dilution action
might minimize the number of close cases by imposing a higher bar
for recovery.
A person whose image is diluted by a noncommercial use (such
as artwork or commentary) must seek recovery in other areas of the
law. Possibilities include privacy law and defamation law. However,
these actions may be difficult for a plaintiff to win. The plaintiff may
hit some of the same hurdles in the privacy context, as some privacy
causes of action exempt newsworthy information from privacy
protection. 80 Furthermore, defamation cases are difficult for public
figures to win. Public figures must show actual malice or reckless
disregard for the truth.' 8 ' Therefore, a person who is injured by a
noncommercial use of her name or likeness may be without recourse.
175.

See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S19312 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Senator Leahy) ("I

continue to believe, as our House colleagues also affirm, that parody, satire, editorial, and other
forms of expression will remain unaffected by this legislation.").
176. For a discussion of this split, see Curran, supra note 81.
177.

See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

the popular song "Barbie Girl" was protected by the First Amendment).
178. See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D.
Minn. 1998) (holding movie entitled "Dairy Queens" satirizing beauty contestants was not
protected by the First Amendment).
179. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing
the different tests used by courts to determine what constitutes a commercial use of a person's
likeness under the right of publicity).
180. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625D (1977) (prohibiting giving
publicity to the private life of another if the matter publicized "is not of legitimate concern to the
public").
181. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974).
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This is not a troubling result because a person should not have control
over uses of her name or likeness that are entitled to full First
Amendment protection.
4. Actual Dilution Requirement
Currently, a right of publicity plaintiff may be able to recover
without showing actual damage to the commercial value of her
persona.1 82 To recover under the proposed publicity dilution83standard,
a person must show actual dilution of her name or likeness.'
a. Standard
Under the FTDA, a plaintiff must show dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark.' 84 A plaintiff must show actual dilution of a
mark. 85 The fact that the junior mark conjures up mental associations
of a famous mark is not enough to show blurring or tamishment, but
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution may be sufficient in some
cases. 186 The same requirement of actual dilution should apply in
publicity dilution cases.
Courts have not settled on a single test to measure blurring under
the FTDA.187 In the end, the blurring analysis may be a case-by-case
inquiry that examines relevant factors as the court sees fit. Because a
goal of dilution law is to prevent uses that whittle away the
distinctiveness of a mark, courts should at least look at the fame of the
senior mark, the similarity of the marks, and consumer confusion.
Thus, courts should ask whether a use blurs the distinctiveness of a
celebrity's persona by associating it with unrelated goods. The
standard for tamishment is more straightforward. Tarnishment occurs
when a mark's goodwill is degraded by association with unsavory
products or ideas.188 Thus, the tamishment inquiry simply asks
whether the use associates the mark with unwholesome conductsuch as drugs, sex, or violence--or with goods of poor quality.189 The

182. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11.8[B][C] (West 1999); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 28:1 (4th ed. 1997).
183. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2003).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
185. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
186. Id.
187. For a thorough discussion of the possible tests, see supra Part III.B. See, e.g.,
Magliocca, supranote 90, at 984-86.
188. See discussion supraPart Ill.B; see, e.g., WELKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 176, 265.
189. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39,43 (2d Cir. 1994).
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trademark tarnishment inquiry translates seamlessly into a persona
tarnishment inquiry.
b. Difficult Cases
In addition to the problems in defining a blurring test, several
hard cases emerge. One such case is that of gradual blurring. For
example, a single small use of Tom Cruise's image in an
advertisement may not cause any actual dilution of his image.
However, many similar, aggregated uses may blur his image by
overexposing him and ultimately reducing his commercial value. The
Supreme Court recently held that a likelihood of dilution is not
enough; the use at issue must rise to the level of actual dilution.' 90 The
case explicitly rejected the possibility that likelihood of future
dilution could be sufficient.1 9' Therefore, Cruise could only recover
for a use of his image that actually blurs his persona. 92 In reality,
though, it is likely that Cruise will be able to show that each small use
whittles away the distinctiveness of his persona by associating him
with unrelated products.
Another difficult case is that of an infamous person whose
name and likeness have negative connotations. Trademark law
traditionally protects the goodwill that a company invests in its
identifying mark. 193 Therefore, trademark law is not well-equipped to
deal with the negative connotations of a mark, which one
commentator aptly calls "badwill.' 94 The fungible nature of
trademarks means that once a mark develops badwill, the company
can simply change the mark.195 However, if a person develops
badwill, the person cannot as easily shed her name, likeness, or
persona. Further, a company does not benefit from badwill in a

190. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
191. Id.
192. Note that the Supreme Court did reserve the possibility that in some cases, blurring
can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. at 434. Thus, if the uses mirror Cruise's image
closely enough, a court may be willing to infer dilution.
193.

See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 2:15 (4th ed. 1997).
194. See Badwill, Note, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1845, 1845-52 (2003). "Importantly, badwill
is not merely the absence of goodwill.... In contrast, a consumer harboring badwill toward a
producer would rather buy a product from an unknown source than from the disfavored
producer." Id. at 1850.
195. Id. at 1846. The author provides an example: "[I]f the producer of Fig Newtons
notices that consumers harbor badwill toward the Fig Newtons mark, she might continue to
produce the same product but market it under a different trademark, shedding the badwill that
consumers associate with Fig Newtons." Id.
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trademark, as negative connotations likely correlate with a lack of
sales. In contrast, a notorious persona may have market value. 196 A
person may be able97to market notoriousness into book or movie deals
or advertisements. 1
Trademark dilution law does not provide a clear-cut rule for the
treatment of an infamous person with a bad reputation. Publicity
dilution law should not provide a remedy for tarnishment of a
person's badwill. The market value of the persona comes from the
development of a notorious reputation. A person marketing her
infamy should not be able to argue that someone impermissibly
tarnished the (nonexistent) goodwill associated with her name or
likeness. Whether publicity dilution should provide a remedy for
blurring of badwill is a more difficult question. On one hand, badwill
can translate into a positive market value that could be diluted by
blurring. It also is difficult to determine when a person is capitalizing
on goodwill and when a person is capitalizing on badwill.' 98 On the
other hand, allowing a remedy could give a person an incentive to
develop badwill. Nevertheless, a person should be able to recover for
the blurring of her badwill. The right of publicity dilution is grounded
in the property rationale of protecting a person's economic value. 199
Its protection should extend to all uses that dilute actual economic
value.
c. Remedies for Nondiluting Uses
If a use does not rise to the level of blurring or tarnishing, then it
does not diminish the economic value of a person's name or likeness.
Therefore, the person should not be able to recover under the
publicity dilution standard. For example, an advertisement for a
movie theater might celebrate the best movie stars of all time. It is
unlikely that this use would blur the stars' images, because consumers
would not associate the stars with the movie theater. Therefore, the
stars should not be able to recover for the whittling away of their
images. In all likelihood, the stars would be without recourse in other
196.
Adam Tschom, Hollywood's Walk of Shame; From Sex to Drugs to Freakish
Fashions, The Frequency of Well-Timed Celebrity Scandals Proves There s No Such Thing as
Bad Publicity, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY 34S (Feb. 24, 2004).
197.

See generally id.

198. For example, actor Charlie Sheen is both a talented actor and a notorious figure. See
Sheen, Charlie,Biography.com, at
http://www.biography.com/search/article.jsp?aid=9481297&page=l &search= (last visited Oct.
29, 2004).
199.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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areas of the law. This is not a troubling result. If the use does not
constitute actual dilution of a celebrity's persona, then the celebrity
does not suffer sufficient economic harm.
D. Revisiting Right ofPublicity Cases
The proposed publicity dilution standard reaches an optimal
balance between protecting a celebrity's valuable image and ensuring
vibrant free speech. Application of the proposed publicity dilution
standard to right of publicity cases illustrates that the proposed
standard prevents use of a celebrity's name or likeness that causes
economic harm.
Many cases will come out the same under this standard. Notably,
many right of publicity cases have been suits by celebrities seeking
recourse for dilution of their names or likenesses. For example, Wendt
v. Host International Corp.2 00 involved famous characters from the
television show Cheers. The defendants designed airport bars that
resembled the set of Cheers, complete with animatronic figures
resembling Cheers actors George Wendt (who played "Norm") and
John Ratzenberger (who played "Cliff'). 20 ' The Ninth Circuit held
that the actors have a triable claim that the use of their likenesses
constituted a violation of the right of publicity. 20 2 Similarly, the use of
the Cheers characters in a bar could constitute dilution by blurring.
The publicity dilution inquiry would turn on the degree to which bar
patrons would come to associate the robots with the actors. If there is
a high degree of similarity between the robots and the actors, people
may come to associate the actors with the bar. This would diminish
the actors' ability to market their characters to other establishments or
advertisers in the future. Consumers would have higher search costs
because they would have to ask to which location or product endorsed
by the actors a particular use refers.20 3
4
Similarly, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,20
late-night television host Johnny Carson sued a portable toilet
business calling itself Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 20 5 Carson
argued that the use of his catchphrase in the company's name violated
200. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
201. Id. at 809.
202. Id. at 811-12.
203. See Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.); Posner,
supra note 20, at 634.
204. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 832-33. The founder of the company paired the company name with a second
phrase, "The World's Foremost Commodian." Id. at 833.
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his right of publicity. The Court held that the commercial value of
Carson's identity was exploited in violation of the right of publicity,
even though his name and likeness were not used.2 °6 Under the
proposed publicity dilution standard, Carson can show blurring. If he
attempts" to market his catchphrase for use on another product,
consumers would have to try to differentiate to which one of the
products the catchphrase is referring. This confusion would constitute
the requisite whittling away of Carson's persona. Carson may have a
claim that the use constitutes tarnishment by associating his persona
with an unseemly product. However, a court should conclude that a
portable toilet is not inherently unwholesome for tarnishment
purposes.
The proposed fame requirement means that some persons who
could recover under the old right of publicity standard cannot recover
under the publicity dilution standard. As discussed in the previous
section, an apt example is Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co. 207 A tile
layer consented to be filmed by a tile company for an instructional
video, but the tile company used his image without consent in an
advertisement. 20 8 The court concluded that the tile layer sufficiently
pleaded a claim of appropriation of his image. 20 9 However, the tile
layer was not famous at the time of the use. Because his persona did
not have economic value, he could not seek recourse under a statute
Rather, the tile layer
protecting the economic value of a 2persona.
0
might have a claim under privacy law. 1
Finally, the proposed actual dilution requirement means that
some persons who would have a cause of action under the old right of
publicity standard would not be able to make a claim of publicity
dilution. One example is White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., 2' a suit by Wheel of Fortune hostess Vanna White. A series of
humorous advertisements for Samsung products depicted futuristic
scenes with current Samsung products to convey the message that the
Samsung products would still be in use in the future. 212 One of the ads
for a Samsung VCR pictured a robot dressed in a blonde wig and a
dress similar to White's, standing next to a game board similar to the

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
at 836-37.
693 N.E.2d 510 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998).
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 513.
Hunt, supra note 4.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.2; see, e.g.,
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id.at1396.
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Wheel of Fortune game show set.2 3 The caption to the ad read:
"Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D. '' 214 The court held that this
use violated White's common law right of publicity. However, this
use probably would not violate the proposed new publicity dilution
standard. The ad sets out a farcical and humorous prediction about the
future. Any similarity between White and the robot probably is not
significant enough to cause consumers to associate White with the
Samsung product. Therefore, the use does not whittle away the
distinctiveness of White's persona, nor hurt White's chances of
getting real-life product endorsements. Thus, White cannot recover
under the publicity dilution standard.
Another case that may come out differently under the actual
dilution requirement is Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc.,215
involving actor Dustin Hoffman. A Los Angeles Magazine article
titled "Grand Illusions" altered famous film stills to make it look like
the actors were wearing current fashions.2 16 The final still was a
famous shot of Dustin Hoffman in the movie Tootsie, in which
Hoffman is standing in front of an American flag wearing a red
sequined dress. The American flag and Hoffman's head were not
altered, but his body and the red sequined dress were replaced with
the body of a male model wearing a cream-colored evening dress and
high-heeled sandals. 21 7 The court decided the case on First
Amendment grounds. 2 18 Hoffman could not recover under the
proposed new publicity standard. First, a court could conclude that
this was an exempted noncommercial use. 2 19 Even if a court did find
this use to be commercial, it probably would not find sufficient
dilution. The altered photographs are not tarnishing because the
spread merely plays off of Hoffman's role in the movie Tootsie.
Taken in context, the spread does not suggest that Hoffman crossdresses.220 Further, the altered photographs of Hoffman probably

213.

Id.

214.

Id.

215.

255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)

216.
Id.at 1183.
217.
Id. The text accompanying the ad identified the still as from the movie Tootsie and
read, "Dustin Hoffman isn't a drag in a butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler and Ralph
Lauren heels." Id.
218.

Id. at 1189.

219.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000).
220. There might be a colorable claim for tamishment in other, less benign contexts. For
example, one can imagine an advertisement for a cross-dressing club that depicts Hoffinan
dressed in drag. Such a use presents a greater chance that consumers would associate Hoffman
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would not constitute blurring; Hoffman's ability to market his image
should not be damaged by what essentially is a parody of his movie
role.
V. CONCLUSION

The current right of publicity prohibits the unauthorized
commercial use of a person's name or likeness. However, the right
does not provide the optimal level of protection for a person's name
or likeness. The current right of publicity is overbroad. A plaintiff
may recover without showing actual harm to the economic value of
her persona. 22 1 A plaintiff may also recover without showing that her
persona is famous and inherently valuable.222 This broad right of
the
publicity is inconsistent with the right's purpose of protecting
223
underlying economic value in a person's name or likeness.
Therefore, the right should be replaced by a right of publicity
dilution that is modeled after federal trademark dilution law. The right
of publicity dilution would be more consistent with the theoretical
underpinnings behind publicity protection.2 24 To recover under the
proposed right of publicity dilution, a potential plaintiff would have to
meet several requirements. First, the plaintiff must be famous. Fame
serves as a useful indicator of economic value in a persona. Second,
the use of the plaintiffs image must be in commerce. This
requirement ensures that high-value, noncommercial speech is not
regulated in violation of the First Amendment. Finally, the plaintiff
must show that the use actually diluted her image, either by blurring
or tarnishment. The blurring inquiry prevents uses that whittle away
the distinctiveness of a plaintiffs name or likeness by associating it
with unrelated goods or services. 225 The tarnishment inquiry prevents
those especially offensive uses of a plaintiffs name or likeness that
associate the plaintiff with unsavory ideas or poor quality goods.2 26
The actual dilution requirement allows a plaintiff to recover when she

with the cross-dressing club. Therefore, that use might tarnish the commercial value of
Hoffman's persona.
221. See discussion supra Part IV.A; see, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:1(4th ed. 1997).
222. See discussion supra Part IV.A; see, e.g., Hunt, supra note 4, at 1621-23.
223. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 570-74 (1977).
224.
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suffers real economic harm. Admittedly, the proposed publicity
dilution regime may create more difficult cases and raise
administration costs.
The overarching interest in striking the correct balance between
property rights and the right of free speech outweighs any costs that
may be incurred by the proposed standard. A right of publicity
dilution would prevent any commercial use of a valuable persona that
diminishes the economic value of the persona. Other harms could be
addressed under other areas of the law, such as privacy or defamation.
The narrower right of publicity dilution would ensure that speech that
would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment is not overregulated. Thus, the proposed right of publicity dilution would strike
the optimal balance between protecting a celebrity's economic value
and protecting the public's interest in speaking about its cultural
icons.

